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Abstract 
Attention has long been characterised within prominent models as reflecting a 
competition between goal-driven and stimulus-driven processes. It remains unclear, however, 
how involuntary attentional capture by affective stimuli, such as threat-laden content, fits into 
such models. While such effects were traditionally held to reflect stimulus-driven processes, 
recent research has increasingly implicated a critical role of goal-driven processes. Here we 
test an alternative goal-driven account of involuntary attentional capture by threat, using an 
experimental manipulation of goal-driven attention. To this end we combined the classic 
‘contingent capture’ and ‘emotion-induced blink’ (EIB) paradigms in an RSVP task with both 
positive or threatening target search goals. Across six experiments, positive and threat 
distractors were presented in peripheral, parafoveal, and central locations. Across all 
distractor locations, we found that involuntary attentional capture by irrelevant threatening 
distractors could be induced via the adoption of a search goal for a threatening category; 
adopting a goal for a positive category conversely led to capture only by positive stimuli. Our 
findings provide direct experimental evidence for a causal role of voluntary goals in 
involuntary capture by irrelevant threat stimuli, and hence demonstrate the plausibility of a 
top-down account of this phenomenon. We discuss the implications of these findings in 
relation to current cognitive models of attention and clinical disorders.  
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In daily life, selective attention allows us to make sense of an otherwise 
overwhelming volume of perceptual input, prioritising the processing of stimuli that are in 
some way flagged as important (e.g. the words on a computer screen, or a voice over a 
phone), over stimuli that may have less importance (e.g. email pop-ups, a colleague passing 
by, or the tactile sensation of sitting in a chair). Some stimuli are selected intentionally, in 
line with our current goals, while others are selected in an involuntary manner such as stimuli 
with high perceptual salience. Prominent models of attention account well for the above 
examples within frameworks involving two key drivers of attention: a goal-driven 
‘endogenous’ mechanism which directs attention in a strategic top-down manner, and a 
stimulus-driven ‘exogenous’ mechanism which directs attention in an involuntary manner to 
perceptually salient stimuli (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Theeuwes, 1994; 2010; Itti & Koch, 
2001; Buschman & Miller, 2007; Parkhurst, Law & Niebur, 2002; Turatto & Galfano, 2000). 
However, in daily life, stimuli may also catch our attention involuntarily, not due to low-level 
perceptual salience, but rather due to the affective content; for example, being associated with 
a potential threat (e.g. a spider on the office wall). It is not readily apparent how this form of 
attentional capture can be accommodated within the goal-driven and stimulus-driven 
dichotomy which is included in these models of attention; indeed, this problem has led to 
calls for theoretical revisions involving a third driver of attention (cf. Awh, Belopolsky & 
Theeuwes, 2012).  
The omission of affective stimuli from these models of selective attention may have 
arisen, in part, because the experimental paradigms which shaped these theories involved 
simple, affectively neutral stimuli, such as basic geometric shapes or letters (e.g. Theeuwes, 
1992; Yantis, 1993; Folk, Remington & Johnson, 1992). Such situations limit the likely 
influences on attention to two factors: the task instructions influencing goal-driven attention, 
and the perceptual stimulus-driven salience of the components of the stimulus display. On the 
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other hand, over the last several decades a rich literature has amassed regarding the study of 
attentional capture by affective stimuli such as threat. This research was initially conducted 
largely with relation to anxiety-related attentional biases. However, recent work has begun to 
investigate threat relevant stimuli more broadly within the framework of prominent selective 
attention models (e.g. Schmidt, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2015; Notebaert, Crombez, Van 
Damme, De Houwer & Theeuwes, 2011). Based on this, there is considerable empirical 
evidence to suggest that affective stimuli, including threat, can capture attention in a 
seemingly involuntary manner (see Carretié, 2014; Vuilleumier, 2005; 2015 for reviews).  
Within the framework of the goal-driven/stimulus-driven dichotomy, involuntary 
selection of affective stimuli, such as threat, might initially be presumed to be stimulus-
driven due to the apparent ability of stimulus-content to override task goals. Indeed, the 
stimulus-driven view of attentional capture has traditionally been the prevalent interpretation 
of such effects (Le Doux, 1995; 1998; Öhman, 1992; 2005; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
Influential theories of attention in anxiety, for example, have suggested that the attentional 
bias to threat stimuli is due to their learnt salience increasing bottom-up perceptual input; 
with highly anxious individuals being more sensitive to certain categories of stimulus-
specific salience (Bishop, 2007; 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 2016).  
Conversely, the stimulus-driven account has recently been challenged by compelling  
evidence that attentional capture by threat may not be unconditional, and may only occur 
when the threatening stimulus is task-relevant (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Everaert, Spruyt & 
De Houwer, 2013; Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois & De Houwer, 2014; Vromen, Lipp & 
Remington, 2016; Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel & Schneider, 2009; Vogt, De Houwer, 
Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013; Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik & Safadi, 2012; Van Dillen, 
Lakens & Van Den Bos, 2011; for reviews of top-down factors in attention and perception of 
threat see Mohanty & Sussman, 2013; Sussman, Jin & Mohanty, 2016). For example, Stein et 
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al. (2009) examined the degree to which the emotional expressions of face search targets 
would heighten the attentional blink (AB) effect (i.e. impeding detection of a second target). 
Fearful versus neutral targets only produced heightened AB when the target response 
involved classifying the emotion of the face – when the response was non-emotional (male 
versus female) the same stimuli showed no difference in the AB effect for fearful versus 
neutral targets. Such findings appear more consistent with a goal-driven, rather than stimulus-
driven mechanism, which would prioritise emotional stimuli with greater relevance to the 
current task goals.   
It is intuitively plausible that individuals might commonly adopt top-down goals 
which prioritise threat detection. Such goals would be adaptive, allowing individuals to avoid 
potentially harmful outcomes by enhancing the ability to detect potential threats in the 
environment when experiencing fear or apprehension. The possibility that threat detection 
goals influence attention indeed accords well with the observation that biases in attention 
towards threatening stimuli are a hallmark symptom of anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Yiend, 2010). However, how could it be that voluntary goals for threat cause seemingly 
involuntary attentional capture?  
 One possibility is that in some experimental demonstrations of attentional capture by 
threat, the effect might in fact not reflect involuntary capture at all, but rather voluntary 
allocation of attention to the supposed ‘distractors’. The paradigms most commonly used to 
demonstrate attentional capture by threat (e.g. dot-probe, visual search, or emotional Stroop) 
present the threatening stimulus in a location that must be attended in order to successfully 
perform the task, often with no obvious performance cost to attending the images (although 
see Grimshaw, Kranz, Carmel, Moody & Devue, 2018, for a recent exception). It might, 
therefore, be argued that in such cases participants are simply failing to follow the instruction 
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to ignore the threat stimuli because it is not possible to both attend to a location and suppress 
the visual information presented there. 
An alternative possibility, however, is that attentional capture by threat may be truly 
involuntary but nevertheless driven by top-down goals. While this may appear paradoxical, 
there is considerable evidence that involuntary attentional capture can in fact occur as an 
unintended consequence of voluntary goal-driven attention (Folk et al., 1992; Folk, Leber & 
Egeth, 2002; 2008; LeBlanc, Prime & Jolicoer, 2008). Compelling evidence from the 
‘contingent capture’ literature suggests that when goal-driven attention is directed to a 
particular type of stimulus (e.g. a particular colour, shape, or even semantic category), any 
stimulus which matches the features which are currently being searched for may capture 
attention, even if they are in some way known to be irrelevant to the task (e.g. being 
presented in a task-irrelevant location). For example, when instructed to search for a letter of 
a particular colour in an RSVP stream of other coloured letters, an irrelevant peripherally 
presented distractor, which shares the target colour, captures attention and results in 
participants being unable to identify a subsequent coloured target (i.e. producing an 
attentional blink; Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992). Importantly, equally salient coloured 
distractors which do not share the specified target colour do not capture attention. In other 
words, participants searching for a green letter are typically distracted by peripheral green 
distractors but not red distractors, while participants searching for a red letter are distracted 
by red but not green distractors (Folk et al., 2002; 2008; Leblanc, Prime & Jolicoer, 2008).  
 The phenomenon of ‘contingent capture’ has recently been found to extend beyond 
low-level visual features to broadly defined goals, such as a conceptual category (e.g. office 
supplies or cars, Wyble, Folk & Potter, 2013; Reeder, van Zoest & Peelen, 2015). Critically, 
contingent capture occurs involuntarily, even though participants know that the stimulus is 
irrelevant to their current task goals (e.g. because it is presented in an irrelevant location in 
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which the task-relevant stimuli never appear). Could it be, then, that attentional capture by 
threat could occur as a form of affective contingent capture?  
Here we provide the first direct test for a causal role of top-down goals in involuntary 
attentional capture by affective stimuli. Note that previous manipulations of relevance have 
only indirectly manipulated goal-driven attention. For example, Stein and colleagues’ 
manipulation of response settings only indirectly manipulates goal-driven selection, as 
participants could conceivably have adopted a goal to select faces across all conditions and 
activated the response set post-selection. Other studies have manipulated affective distractor 
relevance by varying the affective content of search targets, but in contexts in which the 
instructed search goals are identical across conditions. For example, Lichtenstein-Vidne et al. 
(2012) found that during a task involving judging the location of centrally presented images, 
peripheral emotional images slowed responses only when the target images were also 
emotional, and not when the targets were neutral. In this paradigm, however, the emotional 
content was irrelevant to the instructed target selection criteria (an image presented above or 
below fixation), which in both conditions were based solely on location. While it appears 
plausible that participants may have elected to adopt a narrower goal than was necessary to 
perform the task, as goals were neither directly manipulated nor measured it remains unclear 
whether such relevance effects are goal-driven. Indeed, certain manipulations of relevance 
have been argued to affect stimulus-driven mechanisms (cf. Sui & Humphreys, 2015).  
We posit that a direct test of whether goal-driven mechanisms can play a causal role 
in involuntary attentional capture by affective stimuli must meet the following conditions. 
First, the overlap between the capturing stimulus and goal-driven attentional settings must be 
manipulated directly by changing the criteria for selection (e.g. the search goal), such that a 
task can only be completed by adopting this goal. Second, attentional capture can only be 
assumed to be entirely involuntary if the task does not require any voluntary allocation of 
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attention to the capturing stimulus. Any demonstrations of attentional bias to a stimulus 
which participants are asked to search for (i.e. a search target), or to a stimulus presented in a 
potential target location (which necessarily requires some allocation of attention, cf. Forster, 
2013), could potentially reflect the affective enhancement of voluntary attention rather than a 
truly involuntary attentional process; the affective content amplifying attention after it has 
been directed towards the stimulus, rather than causing the attentional capture itself. To our 
knowledge no prior study meets both of these criteria. 
 In order to directly test the goal-driven hypothesis, we therefore designed a task that 
would allow us to experimentally manipulate the participants’ goals, and measure the effect 
of this manipulation on involuntary attentional capture by threat associated stimuli which 
appeared in task-irrelevant locations. To this end we fused the contingent capture paradigm 
(e.g. Folk et al., 2002; 2008; Wyble et al., 2013) with a well-established measure of 
attentional capture by threat: the emotion-induced blindness (EIB) paradigm, in which 
participants must respond to a target presented in an RSVP stream whilst ignoring an 
affective distractor presented beforehand in the same stream (e.g. Most, Chun, Widders & 
Zald, 2005; Smith, Most, Newsome & Zald, 2006; Zheng, Wang & Luo, 2015; Kennedy, 
Rawding, Most & Hoffman, 2014; Kennedy, Pearson, Sutton, Beesely & Most, 2018; Singh 
& Sunny, 2017; see McHugo, Olatunji & Zald, 2013 for review). Specifically, in our task, 
participants were instructed to search for a target stimulus defined by its affective category 
(e.g. positive or threatening), presented in a central RSVP stream while ignoring peripherally 
presented distractor images which were either positive, threatening, or neutral. Importantly, 
the target never appeared in the peripheral distractor locations meaning that it was never 
necessary to allocate voluntary attention to these locations, hence the distractor locations can 
be considered task-irrelevant. Our emotionally laden targets and distractors consisted of 
stimuli that have been widely used in the affective attentional bias literature: animals and 
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emotional faces (e.g. Lipp & Derakhshan, 2005; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Öhman, Flykt 
& Esteves, 2001; LoBue & Rakison, 2013). Goal-driven attentional capture would be 
reflected by greater interference from the threat distractors when these are congruent, versus 
incongruent, with the current search goal. Such a finding would demonstrate that involuntary 
attentional capture by threat could be plausibly accommodated within theories of attentional 
capture under the umbrella of the goal-driven mechanism.   
Experiment 1  
Methods 
Participants. Twenty participants were initially recruited, though one participant was 
identified as an outlier and excluded due to their accuracy being 3 SDs below the group mean 
(16 females, 3 males; Age: M = 22.37, SD = 3). Our sample size of n = 19 was selected on the 
basis of matching that used in the most similar prior demonstration of goal-driven capture 
(Wyble et al., 2013, Experiment 2). A power analysis using G*power software indicated that 
this sample size would afford sensitivity to detect effect sizes above dz = .69 with power of β 
= .80 and an α of .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Hence, we were well 
powered to detect effects half the size of those observed by published demonstrations of goal-
driven capture with non-affective stimuli; specifically, those comparing task-irrelevant goal-
congruent and goal-incongruent distractors within an RSVP task with similar timings and 
settings to our design (Wyble et al., 2013: mean dz = 1.65, SD = .38; Folk et al., 2002: mean 
dz = 1.33, SD = .25).  
Participants were recruited through the University of Sussex subject pool via an 
online advert. They were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment. Ethical 
approval for this experiment, and all subsequent experiments, were granted by the University 
of Sussex Sciences and Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee. 
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Stimuli. The neutral animal stimuli were a range of animal images sourced from 
Google images. In total, 391 images of individual animals, without any other salient objects 
in the scene, were initially selected. The images were all resized to 300×200 pixels and all 
writing was removed. These images were rated in a pilot study by 36 participants using a ten-
point Likert scale measuring how threatening, cute, positive and negative they were. To select 
the most neutral animals, a composite affect score was created by averaging these four scales 
together. The 280 images which were rated lowest on this measure were selected for neutral 
stimuli (Affect score: M = 3.23, SD = .46, highest score = 4.01; highest positive score = 6.31; 
highest cute score = 6.83; highest negative score = 4.08; highest threat score = 3.58). From 
these 280 images we removed images which contained features which could be mistaken for 
part of the target set. For instance, many images of elephants, walruses, and water buffalo 
were removed because their horns and tusks could be mistaken for bared teeth. These images 
were replaced by 35 images of animals which were similar to those ranked in the lowest 150 
images on overall affect (e.g. fish, birds, farm animals).  
The threatening and cute animal images were partly selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997), but in order to provide a 
greater number of distinct threatening and cute animal images (reducing potential habituation 
effects) the IAPs images were supplemented with images from Google images. These latter 
images were selected based on their similarity to cute and threatening animals in the IAPS 
database; cute animals were usually pets or infant animals, whilst the threatening animals 
were either predators in attack positions or snakes and spiders. Based on these criteria we 
collected twelve target images and twelve different distractor images for the cute and 
threatening animal categories. The 24 images used in the threatening animal category (12 
targets and 12 distractors) consisted of six different animals: spiders, lions, tigers, snakes, 
sharks, and crocodiles. For the cute category targets and distractors were comprised of six 
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different cute animals: kittens, puppies, pandas, red pandas, ducklings, and rabbits. Again, 
twelve images appeared as targets and twelve different images as distractors. For both cute 
and threatening categories, all six types of animals appeared as both targets and distractors, 
but not the individual images. To validate the images, arousal and valence ratings were 
collected again from participants in Experiments 3a, 3b, 4, and 5 (see Table 2) which 
confirmed that threat images were considered to have negative valence and be highly 
arousing. All unlicensed images and their ratings are available online via the Open Science 
Framework (link: osf.io/mr5yk). 
The images were presented using E-prime 2.0 on a 16inch Dell monitor with a screen 
resolution of 800×600 and refresh rate of 60Hz (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 2012). The 
experiment was conducted in a dimly lit room. Participants viewed the screen from 59cm 
away, and this distance was kept constant by using a chin rest. All images in the central 
RSVP stream measured 6°×4.02°. The distractors measured, 8.09°×5.35°, these were larger 
relative to the central target due to visual acuity being poorer at peripheral locations. On 
every trial, the distractors were presented above and below the central RSVP stream with a 
gap of .5° separation from the target. Trials were controlled so the specific animal presented 
as a distractor was never the same as the target animal. 
Procedure. Figure 1 presents an example trial sequence in the experimental task. 
Participants were given the following instructions at the start of the task: “You will be shown 
several images of animals in quick succession. You must look out for either a 'cute' (e.g. baby 
or pet) or 'threatening' animal (e.g. predator or poisonous). You will be instructed which type 
of animal you are looking for before each trial. At the end of each trial you must write out the 
name of the cute/threatening animal using the keyboard. The target image will always appear 
in the centre of the screen. Occasionally two other images will appear at the top and bottom 
of the screen, you must ignore these images.”. Search goal reminders were also presented at 
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the beginning of each trial in order to ensure goal maintenance. The cute or threatening target 
stimulus was presented in a nine frame RSVP stream consisting of eight neutral animal 
stimuli which were randomly selected from the total pool of neutral stimuli. Each stimulus 
frame was presented for 100ms with no inter-stimulus interval. The target stimulus appeared 
at positions five, six, seven, or eight in the RSVP stream an equal number of times within 
each block, and was counterbalanced across conditions. The peripheral distractor stimulus 
was consistently presented two slides prior to the target at lag 2 on every trial.  
The peripheral distractors were two images presented above and below the central 
stimulus position. One of these stimuli was always a neutral animal stimulus which was 
randomly selected from the pool of neutral animal images. The other distractor stimulus 
could either be a threatening animal, cute animal, or another neutral animal. Within each 
condition the distractor image appeared an equal number of times above and below the 
central stream. At the end of each trial, the participant typed out the animal they identified as 
the cute or threatening target using the keyboard and pressed ‘Enter’ to proceed to the next 
trial. The dependent variable was the percentage of trials that participants accurately reported 
the cute or threatening animal which had been presented.  
 Before the main task, participants completed a single eight trial practice block with 
four cute targets and four threat targets (the specific images used in these practice trials were 
different from the set used in the main experiment). For the main task, participants completed 
six blocks of 36 trials each, with a period of rest every two blocks, the duration of which was 
determined by the participant. The search condition blocks were presented in an alternating 
format (e.g. cute-threat-cute-threat-cute-threat). The block order was counterbalanced 
between participants, with half the participants completing a threat search block first. When 
blocks were not separated by a rest period, a text warning was presented for 3000ms alerting 
the participant that the search goal had changed. Other than search goal, which was 
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manipulated between blocks, all within participant factors were fully counterbalanced within 
each block. After completion of the study, participants completed self-report measures related 
to anxiety for exploratory purposes. However, given the sample sizes in relation to individual 
difference effects, this data is not reported here. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Scoring. The percentage of correctly identified animals was recorded as the outcome 
measure for analysis. In order to objectively score this measure, an excel formula was applied 
which marked a trial as correct when the spelling of the target animal matched the spelling of 
the response. To make sure that the responses were readable for this formula they were coded 
prior to the analysis, the coding rules and criteria can be found in Supplementary Materials 1. 
During the coding process the experimenter was blind to both the distractor conditions and 
the correct answers.  
Analytic strategy.  Data from Experiments 1, 2, 3b and 5 were significantly skewed 
(skewness ratio > 1.96) therefore an arcsine transformation was applied to the data. All 
statistics were performed upon the arcsine transformed data. For ease of interpretation, graphs 
are presented with untransformed data. We note the results remained unchanged with respect 
to patterns and significance when untransformed data were analysed. Analyses were 
performed using SPSS, and R-studio for Bayesian analyses (IBM Corp, 2016; R-studio team, 
2015). 
For all pair-wise comparisons between experimental conditions, 95% confidence 
intervals were bootstrapped (1000 samples), alongside conventional p-values (Field, 2013; 
Cumming, 2013). Hedges’ g effect size was also calculated as a standardised effect size for 
all pairwise comparisons. 
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 To supplement our main analysis we computed Bayes factors in order to determine 
whether any null effects were due to insensitivity or a true null effect. Further details of this 
analysis are reported in Supplementary Materials 2. A Bayes Factor compares evidence for 
the experimental hypothesis (threat relevant stimuli will result in greater attentional capture) 
and the null hypothesis (threat relevant stimuli will not result in attentional capture). Bayes 
factors ranges from 0 to infinity, values less than 1 indicate that there is support for the null 
hypothesis, whilst values of greater than 1 indicate that there is support for the experimental 
hypothesis. The strength of this evidence is indicated by the magnitude of the Bayes factor; 
values greater than 3 or less than .33 indicate substantial evidence for either the experimental 
or null hypothesis. A value closer to 1 suggests that any non-significant result is due to 
insensitivity and any difference is ‘anecdotal’ (Jeffrey, 1961; Dienes, 2008; 2011; 2014; 
2016). All direct comparisons between conditions were tested using Bayes factors, however, 
p-values were also computed using two-way paired samples t-tests to facilitate comparison to 
previous results. 
Results and Discussion 
Mean accuracy in each condition of search goal and distractor category can be seen in 
Table 1.1 A 2×3 ANOVA with the factors of current search goal (cute/ threatening animal) 
and distractor category (cute/ threatening/ neutral animal) were performed on mean accuracy. 
This revealed that there was no significant difference in the accuracy with which participants 
                                                          
1 Note that it is difficult to give a precise estimate of chance level performance in the 
identification task as this would depend on how many different animal identities participants 
were guessing from. If we were to assume that participants were guessing from the six target 
animals used in each search condition, chance performance would be only 16.67%. Given 
that participants had no prior knowledge of what the six animals would be, chance 
performance would likely be lower than this. Our finding of ~50% accuracy in the 
identification experiments therefore reflects responding well above chance.  
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identified cute versus threatening targets, F(1, 18) = 1.60, p = .222, ƞ2p = .08. There was a 
significant main effect of distractor, F(2, 36) = 7.51, p = .002, ƞ2p = .30, with the cute and 
threatening distractors resulting in lower performance than neutral distractors. Importantly, 
and consistent with the predicted goal-driven capture effect, this effect was qualified by a 
highly significant interaction between target and distractor, F(1.69, 30.47) = 16.11, p < .001, 
ƞ2p = .48 (Huynh-Feldt corrected).  
In order to plot the effects more clearly, we created an affective distractor effect score 
by subtracting the accuracy when the distractor was cute or threatening from the neutral 
distractor condition, both for cute and threat search conditions (see Figure 2a). Performance 
when the distractor was a cute animal was lower when the target was also a cute animal, and 
a similar pattern was also observed for threatening animal distractors when the target was 
also a threatening animal. Thus, participants were significantly poorer at identifying the target 
when the distractor category matched the current search goal, as demonstrated by 
significantly greater distractor effects (i.e. the difference between neutral and affective 
distractors) when the affective distractor was goal-congruent versus incongruent. This was 
true for the threatening animal distractor effect, M = .70, SD = 9.07 vs M = 9.87, SD = 11.11, 
t(18) = 2.60, p = .018, 95% CI[2.54, 16.12], BH[0,15] = 8.06, as well as the cute animal 
distractor effect, M = .39, SD = 10.67 vs M = 12.75, SD = 11.17, t(18) = 4.08, p = .001, 95% 
CI[6.34, 18.06], BH[0,15] = 486.47.  
The majority of errors consisted of naming an animal that was neither a distractor nor 
target, but similarly to the prior study by Wyble and colleagues (2013), on a percentage of 
trials the goal-congruent distractor was named in lieu of the target (15.54% in the threat 
search condition; 21.84% in the cute search condition; see Supplementary Materials 3 for a 
full break down of error type by condition in Experiments 1-3b).  
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---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
To explore evidence for both goal-congruent and goal-incongruent capture by 
threatening and cute animals in detail, we compared target identification accuracy between 
affective and neutral distractors within each search condition (see Table 1). As can be seen in 
Figure 2a, affective distractor effects, computed from affective versus neutral distractors, 
were only observed when the distractors were goal-congruent. Strikingly, there was no 
reduction in performance when the cute and threatening animal distractors were incongruent 
with the current search goal. The Bayes factors for both cute and threatening animal 
distractor effects are under .33 and hence confirm that the null results reflect an absence of 
attentional capture rather than insensitivity. Therefore, there was substantial evidence that, 
within our task, salient affective distractors only captured attention when they were congruent 
with current top-down search goals.  
Note that although the affective ratings for the neutral animals were closer to those of 
the cute versus threat animals, this cannot explain our results. In the goal-congruent 
conditions, both cute and threat distractors produced robust interference effects of similar 
magnitude relative to neutral distractors. By contrast, neither produced interference in the 
goal-incongruent condition. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2a and 2b about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The results of Experiment 1 provide direct evidence that involuntary attentional 
capture by affective stimuli, both threatening and positive, can be induced via the adoption of 
a specific top-down goal, even when they appeared in completely task-irrelevant locations.  
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 sought to extend the findings of Experiment 1, by testing whether goal-
driven capture by threat would generalise beyond the specific stimulus category (e.g. 
‘threatening animals’) to the broader affective category (i.e. any form of threat). To test this 
possibility, we presented another widely used category of threat relevant stimuli as 
distractors, these being emotional faces. If the emotional faces captured attention more when 
they were congruent with the general affective content of the search goal (i.e. threatening 
animal search goal - fearful face distractor), this would imply the ability to adopt a broad 
attentional setting for an entire affective category which generalised automatically across 
conceptual boundaries.  
We chose to present emotional faces as stimuli due to their universal recognition 
across individuals (Izard, 1994; Kohler et al., 2004). In regard to threat processing, 
specifically, we selected fearful faces because attentional biases to fear emerge in infancy, 
suggesting a rapidly learnt or innate signal of threat (Peltola, Hietanen, Forssman & 
Leppanen, 2013). Further, they have been found to reliably activate regions associated with 
automatic threat processing (i.e. the amygdala; Bishop, 2008), with this activation occurring 
more strongly than for other negative emotions such as anger (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, 
Nathan & Luan Phan, 2005). Thus, fearful faces are an ideal threat signal due to their 
universality and their strong relation to automatic threat processing and attention. 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty participants were initially recruited, though 2 participants were 
excluded prior to analyses for taking an excessively long time to complete the search task 
(over 50 minutes, compared to the typical task duration of 20-25 minutes).2 The final sample 
                                                          
2 Including these two participants did not alter the significance or pattern of our findings. 
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consisted of 12 females and 6 males (Age: M = 21.78, SD = 2.39). The sample size was 
retained from our previous experiment. A power analysis using G*power software indicated 
that this sample size would afford sensitivity to detect effect sizes above dz = .70 with power 
of β = .80 and an α of .05 (Faul et al., 2007). Participants were recruited through the 
University of Sussex subject pool via an online advert. They were remunerated with course 
credits or a small cash payment.  
Stimuli and Procedure. Stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 1, with 
the exception that face stimuli were selected as distractors rather than animals. Twelve fearful 
faces, twelve happy faces, and twelve neutral faces were selected; they all shared the same 12 
identities so were matched on every feature except emotion (Tottenham et al., 2009). As in 
previous instigations which found attentional biases towards fearful faces (e.g. Hodsoll, 
Viding & Lavie., 2011), we ovalled the faces to remove any non-emotional identifying 
features of the outline, such as hair style. To fill the opposite distractor location not occupied 
with the face distractor we presented one of twelve different skin patches created from close-
ups of just the skin from the exemplars.  
Due to the face stimuli being taller than animal images, distractors were presented to 
the left and right of the target in an upright position. In order to compensate for the increased 
distance from the centre of attention, the images were enlarged so they measured 
11.33°×7.49°. They were presented with a gap of .5° between them and the central RSVP 
stream.  
Results and Discussion 
The same 2×3 ANOVA was conducted as in Experiment 1, though the distractor 
conditions were now emotional faces (happy/ fearful/ neutral faces). In contrast to the results 
of Experiment 1, the analysis revealed no significant effects across Experiment 2, all p’s > 
.174, ƞ2p < .10. Pairwise comparisons revealed that there was no evidence of generalisation of 
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goal-driven capture across similar affective categories, even when the distractors were 
congruent with the search goal’s general affective category, as can be seen in Figure 2b (see 
Table 1 for analyses). The Bayes factors all favoured the null but were nearer 1, therefore, the 
data were insensitive and required further evidence to draw a strong conclusion. 
It, therefore, appears that in both Experiments 1 and 2 there was an unexpected 
absence of any attentional capture effects from either positive or threatening stimuli when 
these did not share the same specific affective category as the current search goal. It should 
be noted, however, that the distractors in Experiment 2 were presented further away from 
fixation than those in Experiment 1 to accommodate the stimulus dimensions. In order to 
allow a more direct comparison of the two distractor categories used in Experiments 1 and 2, 
further experiments were conducted in which both faces and animal distractors were 
presented in identical locations.  
Experiment 3a and 3b 
The aim of Experiment 3a and 3b was to (1) replicate Experiment 1’s finding of goal-
driven attentional capture by affective stimuli, and (2) further test the possibility that this 
goal-driven attentional capture might generalise beyond the specific stimulus category (e.g. 
‘threatening animals’) to the broader affective category (e.g. ‘threat’), after controlling for 
distractor location. To allow direct comparison of these potential specific and more 
generalised goal-driven attentional capture effects, we incorporated both distractor categories 
into our task and presented both in the same parafoveal locations in Experiment 3a, and 
foveal locations in Experiment 3b. Participants performed the same central animal search task 
as in Experiments 1 and 2, while ignoring distractors that were either threatening animals, 
fearful faces, or neutral animals and faces. Positive distractors were removed in order to focus 
specifically on the effect of different threat distractors on involuntary attention, which was 
the central aim of the current investigation. We expected to replicate Experiment 1’s finding 
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that threatening animal distractors would interfere with target identification only in the 
threatening animal search condition. It was unknown whether, having controlled for 
differences in distractor location, these contingent capture effects would now also generalise 
to the fearful faces (i.e. revealing interference from these affectively congruent stimuli 
exclusively in the threat search condition).  
In Experiment 3b we presented the distractors in the central RSVP stream, rather than 
in peripheral or parafoveal locations, where generalisation may be more likely to occur due to 
greater visual processing at central target locations (Beck & Lavie, 2005). Additionally, all 
previous demonstrations of the EIB presented threatening distractors in a target location (e.g. 
Most et al., 2005). Presenting the distractors in the central stream would allow for a closer 
comparison to previous investigations which have found attentional capture by threat in an 
RSVP stream paradigm. 
Methods 
Participants.  
Experiment 3a. Twenty participants were initially recruited for Experiment 3a, 
though one participant was excluded prior to analysis for accuracy being 3 SDs below the 
group mean, and another because of a programming error (12 females, 6 males; Age: M = 
20.89, SD = 2.65).  
Experiment 3b. Nineteen participants were initially recruited, though one participant 
was excluded prior to analysis for accuracy being 3 SDs below the group mean (16 females, 2 
males; Age: M = 22.44, SD = 4.83).  
The sample size for both experiments was retained from our previous experiments, 
and afforded the sensitivity to detect effects above dz = .70 (β = .80; α = .05; Faul et al., 
2007). Participants were recruited through the University of Sussex subject pool via an online 
advert. They were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.  
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Stimuli and Procedure. 
Experiment 3a. The stimuli and procedure in Experiment 3a were identical to 
Experiments 1 and 2, though in order to compare the effect of emotional faces and 
threatening animals within a single experiment, the following changes were made to the 
design: A 2×2×2 within-subjects design was used: Target type (cute/ threat animal) × 
Distractor type (animal/ face) × Distractor valence (threat related/ neutral). Additionally, all 
images were reduced in size in order to place them in parafoveal vision (>2.5° eccentricity), 
rather than peripheral vision (> 5°; cf. Toet & Levi, 1992). This meant that images in the 
central RSVP stream measured 3.44°×2.29°, and distractors measured 2.98°×4.58° visual 
angle at 59cm viewing distance from the screen. The distractors were presented to the left and 
right of the central RSVP stream with a gap of .5° between the central image and the 
distractor. The order of distractors and targets was pseudo randomly generated in order to 
prevent the distractor being the same animal as the target, or regular pairings of distractor and 
target emerging by chance. 
 Stimuli were taken from the images used in Experiments 1 and 2. The neutral animal 
distractors were six images of six different animals (capybara, sheep, pig, catfish, goose, 
pigeon), these exemplars never appeared as part of the central stream. Similarly, six separate 
threatening animals were selected from those used in Experiment 1. Six fear and six neutral 
faces were selected to be distractors from those used in Experiment 2. Both fear and neutral 
faces shared the same individual identities, meaning that the only difference was their 
emotion. As in Experiments 1 and 2 one distractor image appeared per trial - the opposite 
side distractor location was occupied with an oval patch of skin or animal texture (e.g. close-
up of fur or feathers). Twelve skin and twelve animal texture exemplars were created from 
close up images of faces and animals sourced from Google images. Texture patches were 
presented only alongside their congruent distractor type (i.e. skin patch alongside face 
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distractor), and were randomly selected across the block. To remove shape differences 
between the animal and face distractors, all distractors were ovalled leaving only the key 
features of both animals and faces. They were both presented in an upright position during 
the experiment. 
Six threatening animal images and six cute animal images were selected to be targets 
from those used in Experiments 1 and 2; each target category was made up of the same six 
different animals presented. 3  Neutral filler animals were made up of 192 images selected to 
appear in the central RSVP. Participants completed four blocks of 48 trials each with the cute 
search blocks and threat search blocks structured in an alternating format (i.e. cute-threat-
cute-threat), the order of which was counterbalanced between participants. Within both cute 
and threat search blocks the four types of distractor were presented with equal probability, 
these appeared equally to the left and the right of the target. 
After the RSVP task, participants rated all target and distractor images, in a random 
order, along dimensions of arousal and valence using a self-assessment manikin (see Table 2; 
Bradley & Lang, 1994). All participants from Experiments 3a, 3b, 4 and 5 (N = 79) 
completed the rating task, which was programmed in Inquisit 5 software (Millisecond, 2016). 
Ratings from each individual experiment produced a similar pattern of results. 
Experiment 3b. The task and procedure were nearly identical to Experiment 3a with 
the exception that the distractor appeared in the central stream. These distractors were marked 
as task-irrelevant by presenting them as a 1.53°×2.29° oval, which was presented within a 
grey rectangle amongst the other stimuli which were all complete rectangular images. This 
                                                          
3 The crocodile stimuli were replaced due to very poor performance in identifying these 
targets in Experiment 1 and 2.  These were replaced with images of crocodiles which were 
more visible. 
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change resulted in one fewer neutral filler image per trial, leaving a total of 168 neutral 
animals images selected to appear across the experiment. Additionally, for the purposes of 
counterbalancing, the number of target locations in the RSVP stream was reduced to 
positions six, seven and eight.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Results and Discussion 
For both Experiments 3a and 3b, identification accuracy across the eight conditions 
(see Table 3) was analysed in a 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA: search goal (cute/ 
threatening animal) × distractor type (face/ animal) × distractor valence (threat related/ 
neutral). In order to clearly illustrate the results, we plotted the affective distractor effects for 
both Experiment 3a and 3b (see Figures 3a and 3b); to compute these effects, we only 
subtracted the affective distractor accuracy from the neutral distractor accuracy of the same 
type.  
The analysis for Experiment 3a revealed that there was a non-significant difference 
between accuracy in the cute animal search goal or threatening animal search goal, F(1, 17) = 
1.37, p = .259, ƞ2p = .07, but the same difference was significant for Experiment 3b, F(1, 17) 
= 14.88, p = .001, ƞ2p = .47. There was a non-significant difference between distractor types 
for Experiment 3a, F(1, 17) = .42, p = .524, ƞ2p = .02, however there was a significant 
difference between faces and animal distractors within Experiment 3b, F(1, 17) = 12.03, p = 
.003, ƞ2p = .40. The effect of distractor valence was marginally significant for Experiment 3a, 
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F(1, 17) = 4.24, p = .055, ƞ2p = .20, and significant in Experiment 3b, F(1, 17) = 22.57, p < 
.001, ƞ2p = .57.  
For Experiment 3a, search goal did not significantly interact with distractor type, F(1, 
17) = .69, p = .417, ƞ2p = .04, though this effect was marginal for Experiment 3b, F(1, 17) = 
3.89, p = .065, ƞ2p = .19. For both experiments, search goal significantly interacted with 
distractor valence, 3a: F(1, 17) = 7.14, p = .016, ƞ2p = .30; 3b: F(1, 17) = 28.78, p < .001, ƞ2p 
= .63. Distractor type also interacted with distractor valence in both experiments, 3a F(1, 17) 
= 6.36, p = .022, ƞ2p = .27; 3b: F(1, 17) = 26.26, p < .001, ƞ2p = .61. Critically, for both 
Experiments 3a and 3b, the three-way interaction was significant, 3a: F(1, 17) = 7.25, p = 
.015, ƞ2p = .30; 3b: F(1, 17) = 29.13, p < .001, ƞ2p = .63. 
In both experiments the threatening animal distractor effects were greater when they 
were congruent with the specific search goal, compared to when they were incongruent with 
the search goal, Experiment 3a: M = -2.31, SD = 7.73 vs M = 11.57, SD = 8.99, t(17) = 4.70, 
p < .001, 95% CI[-19.52, -8.10], BH[0,13] = 4305.04; Experiment 3b: M = .05, SD = 12.56 vs 
M = 31.23, SD = 16.45, t(17) = 6.85, p < .001, 95% CI[-39.08, -22.15], BH[0,13] = 45741033. 
Thus, the specific interaction between search goal and the threatening animal distractor 
effects found in Experiment 1 was replicated in both experiments 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3a and 3b about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the distractor effect for the goal-congruent threatening 
animals in Experiment 3b was significantly larger than that found in Experiment 3a 
(corrections were made for lack of equal variances between groups), t(26.32) = 4.45, p < 
.001, g = 1.32, 95% CI [10.97, 28.02]; all other p’s > .501. This supports the idea that the 
distractors were processed more deeply at target locations, and is in keeping with previous 
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evidence that centrally presented distractors interfere more with task performance than more 
peripheral distractors (Beck & Lavie, 2005).  
Follow-up pairwise comparisons (see Table 3) revealed that, in both experiments, 
threatening animal distractors resulted in significantly lower performance relative to neutral 
animals in the threatening animal search condition, but there was no evidence of attentional 
capture in the cute search condition. There was, also, no difference between fearful face and 
neutral face distractors in either the threatening animal search condition or the cute animal 
search condition. All null effects produced Bayes Factors which were below .33, thus 
revealing that there was substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis when threat 
distractors were incongruent with the current search goal. Such a null finding was 
unexpected, especially for Experiment 3b, given that previous investigations have 
demonstrated goal-incongruent capture by threat in a very similar task (e.g. Most et al., 2005) 
– we discuss the possible reasons for this difference in the General Discussion. 
Experiment 4 
Experiments 2-3b found no evidence of attentional capture from threat related faces, 
despite using the exact same face stimulus set that has previously elicited involuntary 
attentional capture in a multitude of experimental tasks (Tottenham et al., 2009). However, in 
our current experiments, the faces never directly matched the task’s top-down goal. 
Experiment 4 sought to test whether the face stimuli would be capable of capturing attention 
in the current paradigm when they match top-down task goals. To this end we modified our 
task search goals, so that instead of searching the central stream for cute or threatening 
animals, participants were now instructed to search for happy or fearful emotional faces. We 
presented identical distractor stimuli to those used in Experiments 3a and 3b, in order to see 
whether current search goals could now induce involuntary attentional capture by emotional 
faces.  
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Methods 
Participants. A sample of 18 participants were recruited for this experiment (11 
females, 7 males; Age: M = 21.06, SD = .54). The sample size was retained from our 
previous experiments, and afforded the sensitivity to detect effects above dz = .70 (β = .80; α 
= .05; Faul et al., 2007).  Participants were recruited through the University of Sussex subject 
pool via an online advert, and were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment. 
Stimuli and Procedure. The experimental design and structure was identical to 
Experiment 3a, with the exception of the following changes. Firstly, participants were 
instructed to search for happy faces, instead of cute animals, and fearful faces instead of 
threatening animals. There were two blocks of 96 trials, one for the happy face search, and 
one for the fearful face search. The order of these blocks was counterbalanced between 
participants. An additional change to the paradigm was that participants had to identify 
whether the emotional face was present or absent on each trial. They responded using the ‘c’ 
and ‘m’ keys, the key-response assignment was counterbalanced between participants. The 
target was present on half of trials, when it was absent, the target was replaced by an upright 
neutral face. Pilot testing revealed that participants were performing at ceiling, thus the 
stimulus presentation time was reduced to 83ms per frame with no inter-stimulus interval. 
Unlike the RSVP of previous experiments which were composed entirely of animal images, 
the neutral filler stimuli were composed of two neutral animals selected from the previous 
pool of neutral images, three inverted faces, and either three or four upright faces, depending 
on whether the target was present or absent. The multiple types of filler stimuli were 
presented in a random order in each trial, their purpose was to increase the difficulty of the 
task. In total, 48 neutral animals were presented in the central RSVP stream, alongside 72 
upright faces and 72 inverted faces all with different identities. The neutral face stimuli were 
taken from the Productive Aging Laboratory Face database (Minear & Park, 2004). The 
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target stimuli consisted of three happy faces and three fearful faces of the same identities. 
These were taken from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009). Distractor and target 
faces were selected so that different ethnicities and genders appeared equally across 
distractors and targets in each individual condition. Additionally, neutral filler images were 
selected so that male and female faces were equally represented, and that different ethnicities 
were presented approximately equally. Thus, the face stimuli appeared as a heterogeneous 
stream of facial features. An eight-trial practice block preceded the task with equal happy and 
fearful targets and equal present and absent trials. Stimuli presented in the practice were not 
presented in the rest of the experiment, and distractors in the practice block consisted of black 
ovals.  
Results and Discussion 
Unlike Experiments 1-3b, the signal detection measure A-prime (A’) was the 
dependent variable used to measure target detection rather than % accuracy. Signal detection 
measures can control for biases introduced with binary responses and are often used in RSVP 
designs (e.g. Brown, Duka & Forster, 2018; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015). A’ was computed 
based on the proportion of hits (i.e. correctly responding ‘present’ when the target was 
present) and false alarms (i.e. incorrectly responding ‘present’ when target was absent) made 
during the present/absent task response (see Table 4; Stanislaw & Todoroff 1999; Zhang & 
Mueller 2005). A′ ranges from .5, which indicates that a signal cannot be distinguished from 
noise (i.e. chance detection), to 1, which corresponds to perfect detection of the target. A’ 
data from Experiment 4 was significantly skewed, however, due to arcsine transformations 
actually increasing skewness we used the original data. We note that the bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals, which are robust to violations of normality, corroborated the 
conclusions based on the p-values calculated using skewed data (see Table 4; Field, 2013).  
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As in Experiment 3a and 3b, we conducted a 2×2×2 ANOVA, although the search 
goal factor was changed to happy/fearful search conditions. The main effect of search goal 
was non-significant, F(1, 17) = .06, p = .809, ƞ2p < .01. The main effect of distractor type 
was, however, significant, F(1, 17) = 8.07, p = .011, ƞ2p = .32; and, in a striking reversal of 
previous results, the face distractors resulted in lower performance overall compared to 
animal distractors. The main effect of distractor valence was also significant, F(1, 17) = 
15.78, p = .001, ƞ2p = .48, with threat related (i.e. fearful face or threatening animal) 
distractors resulting in lower performance than neutral distractors. Critically, the distractor 
type interacted with distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 5.86, p = .027, ƞ2p = .26, revealing that 
interference was observed from fearful versus neutral faces but no difference between 
threatening animals versus neutral animals. The interactions between current search goal and 
distractor type, and search goal and distractor valence failed to reach significance, as did the 
three-way interaction between these variables, all p’s > .175, ƞ2p < .11.   
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
As can be seen clearly in Table 4, Bayesian pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
absence of the three-way interaction was due to fearful faces resulting in lower detection 
sensitivity relative to neutral faces across both the emotional face search conditions. The 
difference between the distractor effects between the search goal condition was non-
significant, M = .05, SD = .10 vs M = .08, SD = .09, t(17) = 1.29, p = .213, 95% CI[-.08, .01], 
BH[0,.11] = .79, though Bayes factor showed that the data were insensitive and the magnitude 
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of the distractor effects was in the expected direction. In contrast to all previous experiments, 
the threatening animal distractor effects did not significantly differ depending on the 
emotional face search goals, M = .01, SD = .05 vs M = .02, SD = .07, t17) = .72, p = .480, 
95% CI[-.06, .2], BH[0,.11] = .38.  
The unexpected significant attentional capture by fearful faces in the happy search 
condition might at first glance be assumed to be evidence of stimulus-driven attentional 
capture. However, it is hard to reconcile a stimulus-driven interpretation of this effect with 
the fact that, across four experiments, we only observed this effect when the task search 
categories were changed from animals to faces. This dependence of the attentional capture 
effect on the central task stimulus category points to a goal-driven rather than stimulus-driven 
mechanism.  
Why then did we not find a significant within-subjects goal-driven effects on 
attentional capture in Experiment 4? We speculate that this may be due to the increased 
overlap in visual features between the two face affective categories. Unlike the visually 
distinct cute and threatening animal categories used in previous experiments, happy and 
fearful faces share common features such as visible teeth. It has been found that, when 
possible, participants search for a single salient visual feature of an emotional face, especially 
in a perceptually demanding task (Calvo, Fernandez-Martin & Nummenmaa, 2012; 
Horstmann, Lipp & Becker, 2012). Indeed, removing these key salient features, such as teeth 
or eyes, from emotional faces reduces the efficient detection of these faces when participants 
are searching for them (Lee, Susskind & Anderson, 2013). Participants would only have to 
hold a top-down search goal for salient mouths or eyes amongst the neutral faces to complete 
the task. This, therefore, would lead to goal-driven capture by all emotional faces possessing 
these shared features. 
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Experiment 5 
Out of five experiments, Experiment 4 was the first to use a present/absent response 
format. Before comparing across our experiments, it was important to check whether our key 
finding of goal-driven attention capture (as observed in all three prior experiments using 
animal distractors) could be replicated using this response format. We therefore conducted a 
nearly identical replication of Experiment 4 with the change that the central search task used 
animal stimuli rather than faces. We preregistered this replication on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF: osf.io/fkexj); any deviations from the preregistered procedure and analysis 
are noted below. The key prediction was that searching for threatening animals would result 
in a greater distractor effect (neutral minus threatening animal distraction) compared to when 
participants were searching for cute animals.  
Methods 
Participants. Initially 26 participants were recruited, though one was excluded for 
scoring 50% or below on detecting one of the target categories. Thus, 25 participants were 
carried forward to analysis, these included 16 female and 9 male participants, the mean age of 
which was 25, SD = 4.07. Sample size was calculated using an a priori power analysis in 
G*power using the smallest effect size from the key interaction terms taken from across 
Experiments 1, 3a and 3b (Faul et al., 2007). This interaction effect size was calculated by 
comparing the distractor effect of the goal-incongruent threatening animals versus the 
distractor effect of the goal-congruent threatening animals. The largest sample predicted was 
24 which was found using the interaction term from Experiment 1 for threatening animals, dz 
= .60, β = .80, α = .05, two more participants were recruited (following our pre-registered 
plan) to pre-empt potential exclusions. Participants were recruited through the Birkbeck 
University of London subject pool via an online advert, and were remunerated with a small 
cash payment. 
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Stimuli and Procedure. The experiment was identical to Experiment 4 with the 
exception of the following changes. The stimuli were presented on a 24inch Dell monitor 
with the resolution set to 1920×1080 with a refresh rate of 60Hz. The targets and distractor 
stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 3a; each image was presented for 100ms. 
The participants had to search for cute animals and threat animals in four separate blocks of 
96 trials (e.g. cute – threatening – cute – threatening). The order of these blocks was 
counterbalanced between participants. The neutral animal filler stimuli which made up the 
central RSVP stream consisted of 204 neutral animals taken from Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Though we pre-registered that both % accuracy and A’ would be the dependent 
variables we only report the results with A’ in the main paper in order to account for potential 
response bias with the binary response. The analyses conducted with accuracy as the 
dependent variable does not alter the significance or pattern of results and is reported in 
Supplementary Materials 4. The same 2×2×2 ANOVA from Experiment 4 was performed on 
the arcsine transformed A’ data (see Table 4); this revealed that there was a significant effect 
of search goal, F(1,24) = 4.87, p = .035, ηp2 = .17, with threatening animals detected more 
accurately than cute animals. There was also a significant difference between distractor type, 
F(1,24) = 8.72, p = .007, ηp2 = .27, with animal distractors resulting in lower accuracy. The 
main effect of distractor valence was, however, non-significant, F(1,24) = .67, p = .665, ηp2 = 
.01.  
The interaction between search goal and distractor type was non-significant, F(1,24) = 
1.83, p = .189, ηp2 = .07. However, the interaction between search goal and distractor valence 
was approaching significance, F(1,24) = 4.21, p = .051, ηp2 = .15, reflecting reduced A’ when 
threatening stimuli were congruent with the current search goal. There was no significant 
interaction between distractor type and valence, F(1,24) = .11, p = .739, ηp2 = .01. The three-
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way interaction also failed to reach significance, F(1,24) = 3.13, p = .090, ηp2 = .12, although 
as seen in Figure 5 a trend was observed in line with that seen in Experiments 3a and 3b.  
Critically, the specific pairwise comparison which the experiment was powered to 
detect (i.e. the difference between the goal-incongruent threat distractor effect and goal-
congruent threat distractor effect) was significant, M = -.02, SD = .07 versus M = .04, SD = 
.08, t(24) = 2.63, p = .015, 95% CI[.02, .11], BH[0,.11] = 7.99. Thus, the a priori comparison 
providing the key test of our hypothesis confirmed that there was an increase in attentional 
capture by threatening animals when congruent with the current search goals (see Figure 5). 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Furthermore, as predicted, the preregistered pairwise comparisons between the threat 
related distractors and the matched neutral distractor revealed that the only condition which 
showed a difference was when the threatening animal distractor was congruent with the 
search goal. This same difference between the animal distractors was non-significant in the 
cute search condition. The fearful face distractors were non-significantly different from the 
neutral face distractors in both the threatening animal search conditions. Bayes factors for all 
non-significant comparisons strongly favoured the null hypothesis, whilst only the goal-
congruent condition showed evidence for the experimental hypothesis, as we predicted in our 
preregistration. 
Hence the patterns of significant attentional capture (i.e. distractor interference) 
observed in Experiment 5 were consistent with the findings of our four other experiments 
involving animal search: Animal distractors captured attention only when goal-congruent, 
and face distractors did not capture attention at all. The discrepant findings from Experiment 
4 are thus unlikely to reflect the change in response mode. Rather, the only difference 
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between Experiment 4 and 5 was the change from animal search to face search. As such, this 
change is implicated as the critical factor determining why face distractors interfered in 
Experiment 4 but not in the other experiments. Indeed, exploratory comparisons between 
experiments revealed that the average fearful face distractor effect was significantly larger 
during face search (Experiment 4, M = .07, SD = .08) compared to the average fear distractor 
effect during animal search conditions (Experiment 5, M < .01, SD = .08), t(41) = 2.83, p = 
.007, 95% CI[.02, .12]. 
Internal Meta-analysis 
To demonstrate the overall evidence for goal-driven (i.e. goal-congruent) attentional 
capture, above and beyond any stimulus-driven (i.e. goal-incongruent) capture, we conducted 
an internal meta-analysis across our six experiments. Full details of this meta-analysis are 
presented in Supplementary Materials 5.  
We conducted a multivariate moderation meta-analysis of the difference between the 
average threat distractor accuracy and the average neutral distractor accuracy in each 
experiment, with goal-congruence as a moderating factor, and Experiment as a random 
effects factor. The analysis was computed using a restricted maximum likelihood estimate in 
the Metafor package for R (Viechtbauer, 2010). This analysis confirmed a highly significant 
effect of goal congruence on attentional capture by threat, g = .61, p = .003, 95% CI [.20, 
1.02], with goal-congruent threat distractors resulting in a greater decrement in performance 
versus neutral distractors, compared to when the same distractors were goal-incongruent.  
We then investigated the magnitude of both the goal-congruent and goal-incongruent 
effects independently. A DerSimonian-Laird random effects model (DerSimonian-Laird, 
1986) revealed a large and significant goal-driven effect with strong evidence favouring the 
experimental hypothesis, (k = 5, N = 98), g = .94, p = .020, 95% CI [.15, 1.74], BH[0,15] = 
4458246×107, and a far weaker non-significant difference between the average of all neutral 
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distractors and threat distractors when they were goal-incongruent, (k = 6, N = 116), g = .17, 
p = .322, 95% CI [-.17, .52], BH[0,15] = .54. In Experiment 4, we have discussed the possibility 
that participants had a general goal for emotional faces, thus capture may not be entirely goal-
incongruent. Calculating the meta-analysis without Experiment 4 led to the goal-incongruent 
effect size dropping to near zero and Bayes factor signifying a sensitive null finding, (k = 5, 
N = 98), g = .01, p = .960, 95% CI[-.27, .29], BH[0,15] = .13. 
General Discussion 
The present study reveals that involuntary attentional capture by threatening stimuli 
can be induced by manipulating current top-down search goals. Across six experiments, 
involuntary attentional capture by threatening stimuli only occurred when they shared the 
same category as the participants’ current search goal (e.g. threatening animals). This was 
also true for positive stimuli. This pattern was observed across the visual field, with 
peripheral, parafoveal, and centrally positioned distractors. These findings demonstrate that 
attentional capture by affective stimuli such as threat could plausibly be accommodated 
within the goal-driven/stimulus-driven theoretical dichotomy as an involuntary phenomenon 
driven by goal-driven attention. 
An alternative recent approach to accommodating affective stimuli into prominent 
models of attention proposes a third mechanism based on low-level inter-trial ‘selection 
history’ (Awh et al., 2012; Theeuwes, 2013). In previous investigations, removing primed 
trials substantially reduced the ‘goal-driven’ distractor effect (Lamy & Kristjánsson, 2013).  
However, analyses of five of our experiments, where we found evidence of goal-driven 
capture, revealed that the removal of trials where the distractor had been preceded by a 
visually similar target did not abolish the decrement in accuracy (all p’s < .047, Hedges’ g > 
.32, B’s > 3.85; see Supplementary Materials 6 for further details of this analysis). Further, 
analysis of Experiments 4 and 5, where there were sufficient trials to compare primed versus 
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unprimed distractors, revealed that there was no significant difference in accuracy (all p’s > 
.232, Hedges’ g < .31, B’s < 1.04). Thus, an intertrial priming account does not appear to fit 
our data. This is not to say that selection history is not found in previous tasks, in which 
unfamiliar coloured shapes are used as stimuli in relatively brief trials (e.g. ~3s; Theeuwes, 
Reiman & Mortier, 2006). It may be, however, that the long trial duration (~5s) in our task 
allowed visual activation from priming to dissipate; or alternatively, the more complex 
images and scenes used in the current task are less susceptible to low-level feature priming. 
Nevertheless, our results support the possibility of a parsimonious account of involuntary 
attentional capture by affective stimuli, which positions it within the existing goal-
driven/stimulus-driven framework. 
Our findings extend recent work on task-relevance (e.g. Everaert et al., 2013; Stein et 
al., 2009; Vogt et al., 2013; Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2012; 2017; Vromen et al., 2016) by 
providing direct evidence for a causal role of top-down goals in involuntary capture by threat. 
Our findings demonstrate that goal-driven affective capture is spatially global, occurring even 
in entirely task-irrelevant locations. On the other hand, it appeared to be rather specific to the 
particular conceptual category of the search target: Searching for one type of threatening 
stimulus (threatening animals) did not induce capture by other forms of threat (fearful faces), 
and vice versa. This contrasts with previous studies that have found contingent capture from 
stimuli conceptually associated with a target category (e.g. other clothing images capturing 
attention during a search for jeans; Nako, Wu, Smith & Eimer, 2014). This might imply a 
distinction between the effects of semantic versus affective categories on attention, and an 
important boundary effect for goal-driven threat capture. In other words, a general desire to 
detect threat might not be sufficient for goal-driven processes to induce threat capture. 
  It should be considered, however, whether the current task context encouraged 
participants to adopt a narrower search goal than was strictly necessary to perform the task 
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(e.g. searching specifically for threatening animals rather than simply for threat content). 
Future research could clarify this issue by adapting our paradigm to include threatening 
targets from multiple categories.  
The Role of Goals in Clinical Attentional Biases 
Viewing attentional capture by affective stimuli as a form of goal-driven attentional 
bias also has interesting implications for understanding the attentional biases seen in relation 
to anxiety and other clinical conditions. Such biases have traditionally been accounted for in 
terms of the clinical syndrome or behaviour increasing ‘bottom-up’ responsivity to certain 
stimuli (e.g. Bishop, 2007; 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Cisler & Koster, 2010). However, 
it seems plausible that some individuals, such as those who are highly anxious, would 
consider certain affectively relevant goals to be highly important, and hence be more likely to 
voluntarily adopt these goals (see Wells & Matthews, 1994).  
 Interestingly, the specificity of affective contingent capture in the present study is 
consistent with patterns observed in relation to attentional biases: A recent meta-analysis of 
the attentional bias to threat in anxiety disorders concluded that threatening stimuli were 
prioritised more when they were congruent with an individual’s specific anxiety disorders 
(e.g. angry face for social anxiety) compared to when they were incongruent (Pergamin-
Hight, Naim, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn & Bar-Haim, 2015). Hence, our 
proposed goal-driven account of attentional capture by threatening stimuli neatly 
accommodates established patterns of attentional biases in clinical samples, and has the 
important implication that these could plausibly be driven by personal concerns and goals 
rather than unconditional biases dictated merely by affective associations.  
 We therefore suggest that a goal-driven mechanism could conceivably provide an 
alternative account of previous laboratory demonstrations of seemingly stimulus-driven 
attentional capture by affective stimuli, in terms of participants’ personal long-term goals 
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overriding instructed task goals. During laboratory demonstrations of attentional biases, 
threat stimuli are typically repeatedly presented in the context of an undemanding task, 
creating the possibility that anxious participants might begin to neglect task goals and ‘look 
out’ for threat.  
It should be noted, however, that goal-driven attentional capture has thus far only 
been demonstrated when individuals are actively, and temporarily, maintaining a search goal 
in line with task instructions (cf. Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein & Humphreys, 2008). More work 
is required to confirm whether ongoing (but perhaps more passive) personal priorities can 
influence attentional settings and hence induce similar goal-driven capture effects. Interesting 
preliminary evidence for this comes from a study by Purkis, Lester and Field (2011), who 
found that biases akin to those found among spider phobics, in relation to images of spiders, 
were found among fans of the television show ‘Dr Who’, in relation to ‘Dr Who’ related 
images, despite searching an unrelated category of stimuli (i.e. horses). This finding is at odds 
with the traditional view of attentional biases for threat as being hard-wired and stimulus-
driven, but is compatible with the view of these biases as reflecting an involuntary 
consequence of long-term goal-driven attentional settings. 
Can Capture by Affective Stimuli Ever Be Purely Stimulus-Driven? 
We note that although we did not find evidence of stimulus-driven attentional capture 
across our experiments, our investigation was not designed to test for such effects, and our 
null results do not rule out the possibility that this might occur under some circumstances. It 
may be that certain features of our paradigm may have reduced sensitivity to stimulus-driven 
effects. First, our use of affective stimuli as targets may have increased their ability to 
“survive" the attentional blink induced by distractors (cf. Reineke, Rinck & Becker, 2008; 
Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Yokoyama, Padmala & Pessoa, 2015). Second, our task was 
rather perceptually demanding, raising the possibility that it might have filled perceptual 
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capacity to the exclusion of distractor processing (e.g., Lavie, 2005, Forster & Lavie, 2008, 
Bishop, Jenkins & Lawrence, 2007). Third, our task used a clear predefined and specific goal, 
which in combination with expected distractors may have boosted the ability to override any 
stimulus-driven effects (Glickman & Lamy, 2018; Grimshaw et al, 2018).  
We were surprised that we did not replicate the goal-incongruent capture by threat, 
especially when we moved the distractor into the same RSVP stream as the target, as has 
been done with previous research showing a goal-incongruent EIB in an RSVP task (Most et 
al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006; Kennedy & Most, 2012; Kennedy et al., 2018; Kennedy et al., 
2014). We speculate that other features of the previous tasks’ design may account for the 
striking differences between our findings and the apparently stimulus-driven effects 
previously observed. Across all demonstrations of EIB, participants are required to search 
one or two RSVP streams for a neutral rotated image amongst upright images and identify 
which way it is rotated (left/right), whilst ignoring the threat distractor appearing prior to the 
target. Due to the target always being defined as the only rotated image in the RSVP stream, 
with no knowledge of the exact rotation prior to the target appearing, it is not possible to 
adopt a feature specific attentional setting and participants might instead rely on a 
perceptually undemanding odd-one-out search goal (see Bacon & Egeth, 1994). Both target 
uncertainty and low perceptual load are conditions in which fearful face stimuli capture 
attention independent of instructed task-goals, whilst providing participants with a predefined 
constant target set or perceptually demanding tasks has been found to abolish threat capture 
effects (Glickman & Lamy, 2018; Bishop et al, 2007).  
Future research should clarify whether stimulus-driven effects would be observed in a 
less perceptually demanding version of our task, when target features are emotionally neutral 
and inconsistent across trials. For now, we note that our current results clearly demonstrate 
that the goal-driven capture was substantial enough to override all of these factors. As such, 
TESTING GOAL-DRIVEN CAPTURE BY THREAT 39 
 
 
 
although stimulus-driven capture may be possible, it may be confined to more limited 
situations than goal-driven capture. 
It might alternatively be argued that ‘stimulus-driven’ effects are only found among 
certain individuals. Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found that in a meta-analysis of 172 studies, threat 
only reliably captured attention in anxious individuals. However, such biases are not 
necessarily indicative of stimulus-driven attentional capture – as discussed above, such biases 
could in fact reflect the participant’s own long-term concerns and goals resulting in the 
momentary prioritisation of these stimuli over the current task goals. Regardless of whether 
low-level stimulus features alone can elicit attentional capture by threat, it is important to 
note evidence that such features can moderate this phenomenon. Indeed, many affective 
categories are characterised by their low-level stimulus features. For instance, individuals 
intentionally tune attention towards salient facial features, like eyes and teeth, when 
instructed to search for emotional faces amongst other stimuli (Lee et al., 2013; Horstmann et 
al., 2012).  
Conclusions 
To conclude, we have demonstrated that current search goals for affective categories, 
specifically threatening stimuli, can induce involuntary attentional capture by these stimuli. 
As such, our data provides direct experimental evidence for a goal-driven account of this 
form of involuntary attentional capture. Our findings have implications both for theoretical 
models of attention, and for understanding the attentional biases seen in relation to anxiety 
disorders.  
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Table 1. Means and standard errors for accuracy across all search goal and distractor 
conditions within Experiments 1 and 2. Data presented are arcsine transformed to account for 
significant skewness. The statistics for all pairwise comparisons between neutral distractors 
and their matched affective distractors are also reported, across both search goals. These 
statistics include p-values from pairwise t-tests, Hedges’ g standardised effect sizes, Bayes 
factors and 95% confidence intervals. The Bayes factors were calculated using a half normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and an expected effect of 15% in Experiment 1, and 13% in 
Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Experiment 
Search 
goal 
Distractor 
condition 
Mean 
(% accuracy) 
SE p-value Hedges’ g BH 
95% CI 
[LB, UB] 
Expt 1 
(n = 19) 
Cute 
animals 
Cute animal 52.93 4.11 < .001 .76 14896.33 [8.16, 17.81] 
Neutral 
animal 
65.68 3.41     
Thre t 
animal 
64.98 3.84 .738 .04 .19 [-4.02, 4.95] 
        
Threat 
animals 
Cute animal 60.67 3.77 .876 .02 .19 [-2.86, 4.97] 
Neutral 
animal 
61.05 3.83     
Thre t 
animal 
51.18 3.58 .001 .60 224.34 [5.65, 14.82] 
         
         
Expt 2 
(n = 18) 
Cute 
animals 
Happy face 56 3.94 .218 .16 .64 [-1.30, 7.23] 
Neutral face 58.86 4.49     
Fearful face 56.80 4.39 .297 .11 .43 [-1.87, 5.86] 
        
Threat 
animals 
Happy face 51.27 3.31 .232 .18 .61 [-1.41, 7.20] 
Neutral face 54.07 3.69     
Fearful face 52.70 3.38 .389 .09 .28 [-1.54, 4.36] 
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Table 2. Mean arousal and valence ratings of target and distractor images by participants 
within Experiments 3a, 3b, 4, and 5 for stimuli included in their respective experiments. 
Standard deviations are presented in brackets. Ratings of each category represent the average 
of both distractor and targets together. The maximum positive valence was 9, whilst the 
maximum negative valence was 1, and 5 reflects neutral valence. The highest arousal rating 
was 9, whilst an arousal rating of 1 was reflects low arousal. All affective stimuli were 
significantly more arousing, and either more positive or negative than their neutral 
counterparts in the expected directions, all p’s < .005.  
 
 
Stimulus category 
Mean arousal 
(SD) 
Mean valence 
(SD) 
Threatening animals 6.50 (1.39) 3.08 (1.34) 
Cute animals 3.97 (2.25) 7.93 (1.08) 
Neutral animals 2.99 (1.28) 5.52 (1.19) 
Fearful faces 4.72 (1.94) 3.19 (.98) 
Happy faces 4.02 (1.74) 7.19 (1.33) 
Neutral faces 2.60 (1.25) 5.10 (1.28) 
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Table 3. Means and standard errors for accuracy across all search goal and distractor 
conditions within experiments 3a and 3b. Data for Experiment 3a is untransformed, whilst 
data from Experiment 3b has been arcsine transformed to account for significant skewness. 
The statistics for all pairwise comparisons between neutral distractors and their matched 
affective distractors are also reported, across both search goals. These statistics include p-
values from pairwise t-tests, Hedges’ g standardised effect sizes, Bayes factors, and 95% 
confidence intervals. The Bayes factors were calculated using a half normal distribution with 
a mean of zero and an expected effect of 13%. 
 
  
  
Experiment 
Search 
goal 
Distractor 
condition 
Mean 
% accuracy 
SE p-values Hedges’ g BH[0, 13] 
95% CI 
[LB, UB] 
Expt 3a 
(n = 18) 
Cute 
animals 
Fear face 51.62 4.42 
.737 -.05 .17 [-5.64, 4.63] 
Neutral face 50.69 4 .51 
Threatening animal 50.69 4.61 
.221 -.12 .07 [-5.92, 1.31] 
Neutral animal 48.38 4.21 
   
 
     
Threat 
animals 
Fear face 53.94 3.68 
.787 -.04 .17 [-5.70, 3.70] 
Neutral face 53.24 3.99 
Threatening animal 47.92 3.30 
< .001 .69 109×103 [7.18, 15.68] 
Neutral animal 59.49 4.40 
         
         
Expt 3b 
(n = 18) 
 
 
Cute 
animals 
Fear face 69.46 4.35 
.549 < .01 .12 [-5.66, 2.82] 
Neutral face 67.99 3.88 
Threatening animal 64.93 3.87 
.998 -.08 .23 [-5.17, 5.36] 
Neutral animal 64.85 3.62 
        
Threat 
animals 
Fear face 58.83 3.57 
.986 < .01 .24 [-5.46, 5.68] 
Neutral face 59.09 4.16 
Threatening animal 32.92 2.39 
< .001 2.46 925×108 [23.58, 38.86] 
Neutral animal 64.16 3.36 
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Table 4. Means and standard errors for A’ across all search goal and distractor conditions 
within Experiments 4 and 5. Data for Experiment 4 is untransformed, whilst data from 
Experiment 5 has been arcsine transformed to account for significant skewness. The statistics 
for all pairwise comparisons between neutral distractors and their matched affective 
distractors are also reported, across both search goals. These statistics include p-values from 
pairwise t-tests, Hedges’ g standardised effect sizes, Bayes factors, and 95% confidence 
intervals. The Bayes factors were calculated using a half normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and an expected effect of .11 A’. 
 
Experiment 
Search 
goal 
Distractor 
condition 
Mean A’ SE p-values Hedges’ g BH[0, .11] 
95% CI 
[LB, UB] 
Expt 4 
(n = 18) 
Happy 
faces 
Fear face .88 .02 
.044 .71 3.67 [1.39, 12.72] 
Neutral face .93 .01 
Threatening animal .92 .01 
.467 .14 .21 [-.01, .03] 
Neutral animal .93 .01 
   
 
     
Fearful 
faces 
Fear face .84 .03 
.001 .80 123.70 [5.61, 16.11] 
Neutral face .92 .02 
Threatening animal .93 .02 
.171 .38 .68 [< .01, .06] 
Neutral animal .96 .01 
         
         
Expt 5 
(n = 25) 
 
 
Cute 
animals 
Fear face .84 .03 
.777 .01 .19 [-.03, .04] 
Neutral face .84 .04 
Threatening animal .85 .03 
.093 -.14 .05 [-.05, <.01] 
Neutral animal .82 .03 
        
Threat 
animals 
Fear face .91 .02 
.837 .09 .31 [-.04, .03] 
Neutral face .92 .02 
Threatening animal .87 .03 
.028 .25 3.42 [.01, .07] 
Neutral animal .90 .02 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Structure of a single RSVP trial and example stimuli from across six Experiments; 
nine images were presented per trial for either 83 (in Experiment 4) or 100ms (in 
Experiments 1, 2, 3a, 3b, and 5) per image with no inter-stimulus interval. Examples of the 
instruction frame depict how the search instructions were presented in Experiments 1, 2, 3a, 
3b, and 5, Experiment 4 differed by instructing participants to search for happy and scared 
faces. The distractor and target frame examples depict the categories of images which 
appeared as stimuli, as well as the location of the distractor in each task, as symbolised by 
dashed lines. In Experiments 1, 2, 3a, 3b, and 5, threatening and cute animal targets were 
presented as targets, whilst in Experiment 4 happy and fearful face targets were presented. At 
the end of the trial participants were either required to type out what the specific animal target 
had been (Experiments 1-3b), or whether the target had been present or absent from the 
RSVP stream (Experiment 4 and 5). The emotional faces in the figure were taken from the 
NimStim image set with permission for publication (Tottenham et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 2a and 2b. Affective distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct 
affective distractor) for cute and threatening animal distractors across both cute and 
threatening animal search conditions in Experiments 1 and 2. The error bars represent within-
subjects standard error, and asterisks denote a significant difference from the match neutral 
distractor: p < .05 = *; p < .001 = **.  
 
Figure 3a and 3b. Affective distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct threat 
distractor) for fearful face and threatening animal distractors across both cute and threatening 
animal search conditions in Experiment 3a and Experiment 3b. The error bars represent 
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within-subjects standard error, and asterisks denote a significant difference from the match 
neutral distractor: p < .05 = *; p < .001 = **.  
 
Figure 4. Affective distractor effects (A’ neutral distractor – A’ threat distractor) for fearful 
face and threatening animal distractors across both happy and fearful face search conditions 
in Experiment 4. The error bars represent within-subjects standard error, and asterisks denote 
a significant difference from the match neutral distractor: p < .05 = *; p < .001 = **.  
 
Figure 5. Affective distractor effects (A’ neutral distractor – A’ threat distractor) for fearful 
face and threatening animal distractors across both happy and fearful face search conditions 
in Experiment 5. The error bars represent within-subjects standard error, and asterisks denote 
a significant difference from the match neutral distractor: p < .05 = *; p < .001 = **. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TESTING GOAL-DRIVEN CAPTURE BY THREAT 57 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 2a and 2b. 
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Figure 3a. and 3b 
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Figure 4.  
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Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
